This seems to be a reformulation of dualism; and, like all such attempts to define human consciousness in terms of two separate natures (emotion and intellect, mind and body, spiritual and physical) it fails to account for the degree of blurring - or interpenetration - between any two identifiable mental states and functions.
Further, it fails on the fallacy of 'cause and effect', a philosophical abstraction used in mathematics and science which is, at best, applied with caution in systems dominated by feedback loops and characterised by chaotic sensitivity. Often, the best we can say is that A influences B, or that they are correlated but not known to share a causal link.
Can you point out more specifically where I'm applying this fallacy and what I'm erroneously arguing from it? It's not clear to me that I've actually argued anything very much in this post, in any sense which involves proceeding from premises to a conclusion.
And yes, there is certainly blurring and interpenetration at the boundary, and in some situations that's important; but in this case I don't think it invalidates my basic point.
I view the concept of an emotional side and a reasoning side as just another form of dualism.
As for where you're applying causation: "In correct operation, the emotional side sets long-term goals and policy, which the reasoning side then tries to find the best ways to achieve." As if detailed actions are 'caused' or initiated by the reasoning side, in pursuit of goals 'set' by the emotions; in practice, all decisions and actions have interacting contributions of logic and 'gut feeling', and all attempts to separate and categorize the two are misguided.
Particularly so, when there is so much looping and recursion (and often, internal contradition) in the decision, within and between the 'logic' and 'emotion', that the concept of a causal chain is meaningless.
I doubt we're going to manage to reach any kind of synthesis here; "all attempts [...] are misguided" suggests to me that you won't be satisfied until I retract this entire post and recant my viewpoint completely. Which I won't do, because although your points about overlap and interaction are entirely reasonable I don't think they invalidate the entire approach. The dividing line is certainly pretty fuzzy, but that doesn't stop it from being a meaningful concept: many concepts without a sharply defined boundary are useful concepts nonetheless.
In particular, I disagree that in practice most or all decisions have so much intermingling of both sides that it's impossible to tell where any given impulse came from. I think in many entirely practical cases, it can be pretty clear one way or the other.
I thought that simont was just describing how his brain works, not actually arguing that the brain is divided into a reasoning sphere and an emotional sphere.
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Further, it fails on the fallacy of 'cause and effect', a philosophical abstraction used in mathematics and science which is, at best, applied with caution in systems dominated by feedback loops and characterised by chaotic sensitivity. Often, the best we can say is that A influences B, or that they are correlated but not known to share a causal link.
And yes, there is certainly blurring and interpenetration at the boundary, and in some situations that's important; but in this case I don't think it invalidates my basic point.
I view the concept of an emotional side and a reasoning side as just another form of dualism.
As for where you're applying causation: "In correct operation, the emotional side sets long-term goals and policy, which the reasoning side then tries to find the best ways to achieve." As if detailed actions are 'caused' or initiated by the reasoning side, in pursuit of goals 'set' by the emotions; in practice, all decisions and actions have interacting contributions of logic and 'gut feeling', and all attempts to separate and categorize the two are misguided.
Particularly so, when there is so much looping and recursion (and often, internal contradition) in the decision, within and between the 'logic' and 'emotion', that the concept of a causal chain is meaningless.
In particular, I disagree that in practice most or all decisions have so much intermingling of both sides that it's impossible to tell where any given impulse came from. I think in many entirely practical cases, it can be pretty clear one way or the other.